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Abstract 
What is the impact of participation in commodity chains on producer welfare? Contract 
farming – wherein a processing firm delegates its production of agricultural commodities 
to growers – is often viewed as a means of increasing grower welfare in developing 
countries. Because the nonrandom participation of growers in contract farming has so far 
not been dealt with convincingly, whether participation in contract farming increases 
welfare is up for debate. This paper uses the results of a contingent valuation experiment 
to estimate willingness to pay to enter contract farming, which is then used to control for 
actual participation in contract farming. Using data from Madagascar, results indicate that 
contract farming entails a 12- to 18-percent increase in income; a 16-percent decrease in 
income volatility; a two-month decrease in the duration of the hungry season; and a 30-
percent increase in the likelihood that a household receives a formal loan. 
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1. Introduction 
With rising incomes and falling trade barriers over the past 60 years, consumers throughout the 
industrialized world have increasingly valued food diversity and availability. This is why the 
average US supermarket offers several varieties of tomatoes at any given time, for example, or 
why it commonly sells summer crops such as strawberries in the middle of winter. Likewise, 
with rising incomes throughout the developing world, supermarkets are playing an increasingly 
important role in providing consumers in developing countries with a more stable supply of a 
greater number of agricultural commodities. 
 
Rather than relying on commodities purchased at the farm gate or on spot markets, however, 
supermarkets rely on complex supply chains in which commodities are produced under contract 
(Reardon and Berdegué, 2002; Reardon et al., 2003). Consequently, contract farming – the 
economic institution wherein a processing firm and a grower enter a contract in which the firm 
delegates its production of agricultural commodities to the grower – is playing an increasingly 
important role in developing countries. 
 
Moreover, although industrialized countries remain the top sources of US food imports, “the 
greatest growth [of US food imports] between 1998 and 2007 was among imports from the 
developing countries” (USDA, 2009), and with the advent of Fair Trade labeling in the late 
1980s and the growing popularity of Fair Trade commodities in industrialized countries over the 
last decade, industrialized-country consumers are increasingly linked to developing-country 
producers, as Fair Trade commodities can now be purchased from Whole Foods in the US; Tesco 
in the UK; Loblaws in Canada; and Carrefour in France and elsewhere. In India, for example, 
Nestlé’s biggest milk processing facility in the Punjab contracts with over 140,000 agricultural 
households (McMichael, 2009). Lastly, if the US offers any guidance as to what the future has in 
store for developing countries, 36 percent of the crops and livestock produced in the US are 
produced under contract, with estimates ranging from 21 percent for cattle to almost 90 percent 
for poultry (IATP, 2010). 
 
But what is the impact of participating in contract farming on the welfare of the growers? 
Although much has been written on agricultural supply chains in general (Reardon and Timmer, 
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2005) and on contract farming in particular (Minot, 1986; Grosh, 1994; and Bijman, 2008), little 
is known about the actual welfare impacts of the institution on the households that choose to 
participate as growers. Intuition suggests that contract farming should at the very least increase 
the expected welfare of the households involved. If this were not the case, the assumption of 
individual rationality – the cornerstone of modern social science – dictates that they should 
refuse to participate in contract farming, just as it dictates that they should stop participating if 
these arrangements fail to increase their welfare. Thus, although contract farming is viewed by 
some as a means of fostering economic development by resolving several market failures (Grosh, 
1994), however, others view the institution as a means of labor exploitation by capitalists (Watts, 
1994; Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997).1
 
 
Using data from Madagascar, this paper therefore studies the direct impact of participation in 
contract farming on several indicators of household welfare (i.e., income, income per capita, 
income per adult equivalent, income net of revenues from contract farming, duration of the 
hungry season, and whether the household has received a formal loan over the past year) as well 
as the indirect impact of participation in contract farming on welfare by testing whether the 
households who participate in contract farming have comparatively less volatile income 
measures. 
 
The contribution of this paper lies in the way it identifies impact of contract farming on 
welfare. Indeed, because participation in contract farming is not randomly distributed across 
households, an important challenge is to find a suitable instrumental variable (IV) to identify the 
impact of contract farming on welfare. That is, one must find a variable which explains 
participation in contract farming but which is also exogenous to household welfare. Without such 
a variable, one’s estimate of the impact of participation in contract farming on household welfare 
will be biased.  
 
                                                 
1 Such conclusions are not exclusive to social scientists. The executive director of the US-based Organization for 
Competitive Markets, a think-tank whose mission is to oppose the consolidation of firms in US agriculture, has been 
quoted as saying that farmers who enter contract farming arrangements “essentially become indentured servants on 
their own land” (Laskawy, 2009). 
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The IV used to identify the impact of participation in contract farming in this paper is a 
respondent’s willingness to pay (WTP) to participate in contract farming, which is derived from 
a dichotomous choice contingent valuation experiment. Respondents were asked whether they 
would agree to participate in a contract farming arrangement which would require an initial 
investment whose value was randomly generated during fieldwork, but which would increase 
their annual income with certainty. Because the hypothetical initial investment was randomly 
generated, the source of variation used in estimating WTP is completely exogenous to welfare. 
Moreover, because WTP captures a respondent’s marginal utility of participation in contract 
farming, it effectively controls for the various sources of unobserved heterogeneity between 
respondents, such as various subjective perceptions, risk preferences, entrepreneurship, technical 
ability, etc. which all affect preferences over contract farming. These changes in preferences 
which are captured by different WTPs.2
 
 
Previous studies have instrumented participation in contract farming using a measure of 
respondent trustworthiness (Warning and Key, 2002); the number of organizations (including 
agricultural organizations) a respondent belongs to (Simmons et al., 2005); the distance between 
a respondent’s farm and the farm of the village chief (Miyata et al., 2009); the number of female 
laborers in the respondent’s household as well as a dummy for whether a female in the household 
is a member of a women’s organization (Maertens, 2009); and respondent membership in a 
farmer group (Rao and Qaim, 2010).3
                                                 
2 No less important is the question of reverse causality. Indeed, both (i) whether there is cognitive dissonance (i.e., 
whether actual participation in contract farming affects WTP); or (ii) whether welfare causally affects WTP are 
discussed at length in section 3 and tested for in section 4. 
 In all cases, the exogeneity of the IVs used – whether they 
are orthogonal to the welfare measure of interest – is debatable, and one can easily come up with 
reasons why they are, in fact, not exogenous to the outcomes studied. Similarly, Minten et al. 
(2009) only observe households who participate in contract farming, and so they resort to 
comparing households who participate in contract farming with households who do not 
participate in contract farming by constructing a control group from a different data set. 
3 Instead of using an IV, one could rely instead on propensity score matching, as in Maertens and Swinnen (2009). 
The latter, however, assumes that the difference between the treatment and control groups (i.e., in this case, between 
the households who participate in contract farming and those who do not) can be fully accounted on the basis of 
observables (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Because several unobservable factors (e.g., risk preferences, 
entrepreneurship, technical ability, etc.) likely drive the decision to go into contract farming, however, this paper 
does not further discuss propensity score matching. 
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Consequently, the nonrandom participation of growers in contract farming has so far not been 
dealt with convincingly, which calls into question the welfare impacts of contract farming 
estimated in the extant literature. Thus, whether participation in contract farming increases 
welfare is still up for debate. 
 
The empirical results in this paper indicate that participation in contract farming increases 
household income by 12 percent; household income per capita by 16 percent; household income 
per adult equivalent by 18 percent; it decreases the duration of the hungry season experienced by 
the household by about two months; that it increases the likelihood that a household receives a 
loan from a bank or a microfinance institution (MFI) by about 33 percent; but it has no impact on 
income sources other than contract farming revenue, i.e., there are no spillovers from contract 
farming on other sources of income. Perhaps more importantly, empirical results indicate that 
participation in contract farming decreases vulnerability and indirectly increases welfare by 
decreasing the volatility of total household income, income per capita, and income per adult 
equivalent by 16 percent, but that it has no such impact on household income net of contract 
farming revenue. In addition, a comparison of the parametric WTP approach with a simple 
nonparametric method developed in this paper of computing a lower-bound on WTP for each 
respondent shows robust ATE estimates for all welfare outcomes. Finally, a comparison of the 
WTP approach with the naive ordinary least squares (OLS) case where one assumes that 
participation in contract farming is randomly distributed – and therefore exogenous to welfare – 
leads to a number of results that are important for policy. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the data is discussed along 
with descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical framework and the strategy used in 
this paper to identify the effect of contract farming on welfare. In section 4, empirical results are 
presented and discussed at length. Section 5 concludes by discussing the research and policy 
implications of the empirical findings. 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper were collected between July and December 2008 for a study of 
contract farming commissioned by the Economic Development Board of Madagascar (EDBM) 
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on behalf of the World Bank. Six regions were visited by the survey team, three of which were 
chosen from commune census data for their relatively high density of contract farming, with the 
remaining three chosen on account of their being classified as high-priority “growth areas” by 
EDBM. Figure 1 shows a map of the 22 regions of Madagascar: the six regions chosen for data 
collection were Alaotra-Mangoro (region 11 on the map in figure 1), Analamanga (4), Anosy 
(22), Diana (1), Itasy (3), and Vakinankaratra (5). The “growth areas” are regions 1, 5, and 22. 
 
Within each region, the two communes with the highest density of contract farming were 
retained. Finally, within each of the 12 communes, 50 households were interviewed who 
participated in contract farming, and 50 households were interviewed who did not participate in 
contract farming.4
 
 For each household, data were collected at the household, plot, crop, and – 
whenever applicable – contract levels. The data thus consist of 1200 households, half of which 
are participants in contract farming. Because of the sampling scheme, probability weights are 
used to bring the sample as close as possible to a random sample throughout the paper unless 
noted otherwise. Table 1 synthesizes the six regions and 12 communes included in the data as 
well as the main contracted crops in each commune. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics. Although the sample was designed so as to have 50 
percent of the households participating in contract farming, the presence of missing observations 
for some of the variables means that only 1,178 households were retained for analysis, of which 
49.8 percent are participants in contract farming.  
 
The average household in the data is composed of 5.6 individuals, almost half of whom are 
dependents.5
                                                 
4 Such a factorial design (List et al., 2010), in which the sample is split evenly between the treatment and the control 
group, is ideally suited for cases where the variance of the outcome (in this case, the variance of the various welfare 
measures) is constant across the treatment and the control group, which is unfortunately not the case in this context. 
 The majority of households in the sample are headed by a male, with only nine 
percent of households headed by a female. Almost one in eight households is headed by an 
individual who is single (i.e., who has never married or is widowed), and one in eight households 
is headed by a migrant (i.e., someone who was not born in the commune). The average 
5 A household’s dependency ratio is obtained by dividing the number of individuals under 15 or above 65 years of 
age in the household by the total number of individuals in the household. The inverse of a household’s dependency 
ratio is thus a rough proxy for labor quality within the household. 
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household head is 43 years old, has completed six years of education, and has almost 21 years 
worth of agricultural experience. Finally, about one in four household heads is a member of one 
or more peasant organizations other than contract farming groups, and the average household 
head is forbidden from doing agricultural work a little over three weeks per year.6
 
 
In terms of welfare, total annual household income is on average equal to US$977, but this 
figure drops down to US$868 when excluding income from contract farming.7,8
 
 A very naive 
back-of-the-envelope calculation therefore suggests that the average contract farming participant 
household derives an extra $218 per year from its participation in contract farming, or just about 
a 25 percent increase in income. In a country where the nominal GDP was of US$468 the year 
the data were collected, this difference in mean income between participants in contract farming 
and nonparticipants thus appears a prima facie nontrivial (IMF, 2009). Of course, this is only 
suggestive as it fails to control for the nonrandom nature of participation in contract farming as 
well as for a number of confounding factors. 
Similarly, total income per capita within the household is equal to US$188, and total income 
per adult equivalent is equal to US$233.9
 
 The average household experienced a hungry season – 
a period during which one or more individual within the household unwillingly eat less than 
three meals a day – that lasted three and a half months, and 12 percent of the households had 
received a formal (i.e., bank or MFI) loan in the year preceding data collection.  
The average household owns US$222 in working capital (i.e., plow, cart, weeder, harrow, 
tractor, and other agricultural equipment), and $698 in other assets (i.e., television, radio, 
bicycle, cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, poultry, jewelry, businesses, bank account balance, and 
                                                 
6 The Malagasy observe a multiplicity of taboos, including a prescription against doing agricultural work on certain 
days. This taboo, which varies between households within a given village, has been found to have a significant 
negative impact on agricultural productivity by Stifel et al., 2008. See Ruud (1960) for a detailed anthropological 
survey of the many taboos observed by the Malagasy. 
7 US$1 ≈ 2000 Ariary when the data were collected. 
8 A household’s total income includes (i) its income the sales of animals (cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and poultry); (ii) 
its wages from various sources of labor (herding, agriculture, state, business, and other wages); (iii) its income from 
nonagricultural activities (crafts, trade, hunting and fishing, forestry, mining, pensions, transfers, and transportation); 
(iv) its income from leases (land, cattle, and equipment rentals) and from sales of animal byproducts (milk and 
eggs); and (v) its income from contract farming. 
9 A household’s total number of adult equivalents (Deaton, 1997) was obtained by treating each individual under 15 
as 0.5 adult, each individual between the ages of 15 and 65 as one adult, and each individual over 65 as 0.75 adults. 
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landholdings). Finally, as far as landholdings go, the average household owns 1.5 hectares of 
land in total. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
The core equation to be estimated in this paper is such that 
 
 ,       (1) 
 
where  is an indicator of welfare (i.e., income, income per capita, income per adult equivalent, 
duration of the hungry season, and a dummy for whether the household receives a formal loan) 
for household i;  is a vector of household characteristics;  is a dummy equal to one if the 
household participates in contract farming and equal to zero otherwise;  is a vector of dummies 
for each region j; and  is an error term with mean zero. Equation 1, however, does not and 
cannot control for the crop grown by the household, because the unit of analysis is the household 
and not the plot. The fact that most households grow more than one crop makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to control for the crops grown. Because rice is the main crop grown by almost every 
household in Madagascar, however, and because the variation in contracted crops can be largely 
explained by regional differences (table 1), the variation in crops is largely controlled for by 
regional dummies in this paper. 
 
The goal of this paper is to estimate , which represents the impact of participation in 
contract farming on household welfare. In this sense,  allows calculating the average treatment 
effect of contract farming (ATE; see Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 18), which is such that 
 
 ,          (2) 
 
where  is household welfare if the household participates in contract farming and where  is 
household welfare if the household does not participate in contract farming. One can thus think 
of the problem posed by estimating the ATE as a missing data problem: data is missing on  for 
the households that participate in contract farming, and data is missing on  for the households 
that do not participate in contract farming.  
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Because participation in contract farming is not randomly distributed across households, the 
equation 
 
 ,      (3) 
 
is first estimated as a probit and used to derive obtain , the vector of predicted probabilities 
obtained from estimating equation 3 (i.e., the predicted value of ). Equation 1 can then be 
estimated using , , and  as instruments for  (see Wooldridge, 2002, procedure 18.1 for a 
discussion). The next section discusses the identification strategy adopted in this paper to 
identify the impact of contract farming on household welfare, i.e., the instrument for 
participation in contract farming. 
 
3.1. Identification Strategy 
As is often the case, the identification of the ATE is far from given in this context. Indeed, 
because the data are cross-sectional and include only one observation per household, one cannot 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity between households by incorporating household fixed 
effects. Moreover, participation in contract farming is almost surely driven by some 
unobservable factor, which would bias any estimated ATE from contract farming obtained from 
a naive estimation of equation 1. For example, because contract farming often insures growers 
against price risk via the use of piece rates (Grosh, 1994), it is likely that participation in contract 
farming is driven by the respondent’s risk preferences. Risk preferences, however, are difficult to 
estimate from survey data, and proxies for risk preferences are only correlated with true risk 
preferences by assumption (e.g., constant relative risk aversion; decreasing absolute risk 
aversion; etc.). Even if one were to correctly hypothesize the relationship between risk 
preferences and a risk proxy included on the right-hand side of equation 1, the error term could 
still be correlated with that proxy (Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002), which would bias the estimate 
of . It could also be that participation in contract farming is driven by the respondent’s 
entrepreneurial or technical abilities, which are very difficult to measure and which are 
consequently omitted from most studies such as this one. 
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To overcome this difficulty, this paper instruments  – the dummy variable measuring 
whether a household participates in contract farming – using a respondent’s willingness to pay to 
participate in contract farming, which is derived from a simple dichotomous choice contingent 
valuation experiment conducted during fieldwork (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Arrow et al., 
1993). Each household in the sample was asked the question 
 
“Would you be willing to enter a contract farming agreement that would necessitate an 
initial investment of 25,000–50,000–75,000–100,000–125,000–150,000 Ariary (i.e., US$ 
12.5–25–37.5–50–62.5–75) but which would increase your annual income by 10 
percent?,” 
 
where the initial investment was randomly generated by the throw of a die. This allows 
estimating the following equation as a probit (Cameron and James, 1987) 
 
 ,       (4) 
 
where  is equal to one if the respondent would accept entering a contract that would require an 
initial investment equal to  but increase her annual income by 10 percent and equal to zero 
otherwise and the other variables are defined as before. Using the results from estimation 4, one 
can compute 
 
 ,        (5) 
 
where  is household i’s willingness to pay to enter contract farming.10
 
 Estimated WTP is 
then used as the instrument  for participation in contract farming.  
Thus, because the value of the initial investment required by the hypothetical contract offered 
in the contingent valuation exercise was randomly generated during fieldwork, the variation in 
estimated WTP is exogenous to welfare. More importantly, estimated WTP controls for the 
unobserved heterogeneity between respondents because it is a direct measure of the marginal 
                                                 
10 The use of a probit in equation 4 assumes that WTP is normally distributed. The normality assumption is relaxed 
in section 3.3, which develops a simple nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimate to conduct robustness checks.  
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utility derived by respondents from participation in contract farming. For example, a respondent 
who is risk-averse, and who perceives that participating in contract farming would help him 
transfer the price risk he would otherwise face to the processing firm, is different from an 
otherwise identical risk-neutral respondent who does not mind bearing price risk, and this 
difference in risk preferences is captured by the different valuation between individuals for the 
hypothetical contract. Likewise, an entrepreneurial respondent, who would rather start his own 
business, is different from an otherwise identical but less entrepreneurial respondent who would 
rather produce under contract for a processing firm, and this difference is also perceived by the 
different valuation between individuals for the hypothetical contract. Similarly, a respondent 
with a high level of agricultural ability and for whom the total cost of producing a given level is 
different from an otherwise identical but low-ability respondent, a difference that is once again 
reflected in the different valuations between individuals for the hypothetical contract. In other 
words, observationally identical respondents can derive different marginal utilities from contract 
farming due to unobservable characteristics, but those differences in marginal utilities are 
captured by WTP for contract farming. 
 
Some may object that the IV used in this paper suffers from a reverse causality problem 
when studying the impact of contract farming on income, income per capita, and income per 
adult equivalent. It is a priori true that because respondents are asked to evaluate a hypothetical 
contract that would increase their income by 10 percent, and because income differs between 
respondents, a respondent’s response to the contingent valuation question may depend on his 
income. This is something one can test for, however. Indeed, because two of the welfare 
outcomes studied in this paper (i.e., the duration of the hungry season and the likelihood the 
household has received a formal loan in the past 12 months) depend on income, WTP is 
estimated both without (for the income measures) and with income (for the duration of the 
hungry season and for the likelihood of having received a formal loan) as a conditioning variable 
in what follows. The empirical results for WTP estimation show that income is (i) statistically 
insignificant as a determinant of WTP; and (ii) whether income is included or not, the estimated 
coefficients and significance levels for all other estimated coefficients do not change, and neither 
does the R-square measure (see table 4, discussed below along with additional nonparametric 
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evidence), which invalidates the concern that there may be reverse causality between income and 
WTP. 
 
Lastly, one could also object that a respondent’s actual participation in contract farming 
could affect her answer to the hypothetical participation question posed by the contingent 
valuation exercise because they have first-hand knowledge of the institution. The sampling 
strategy, however, should insure against such reverse causality given that even respondents who 
do not participate in contract farming have a thorough knowledge of the institution by virtue of 
living in the same small, close-knit villages as the respondents who participate in contract 
farming. Moreover, recent research at the intersection of psychology and economics has 
invalidated almost every study that had previously found evidence in favor of the hypothesis that 
choices affect rather than reflect preferences, i.e., in favor of cognitive dissonance (Chen, 2008). 
In any event, section 4 tests for this kind of cognitive dissonance and shows empirically, both 
parametrically and nonparametrically, that estimated WTP does not differ systematically 
between the respondents who actually participate in contract farming and those who do not. 
 
3.2. Grower Selection or Firm Discrimination? 
Even though the WTP method presented above controls for the supply of growers (i.e., the 
nonrandom selection of households into contract farming), there is also a demand for growers on 
the part of processing firms, and firms discriminate between potential growers when choosing 
contracting partners. 
  
This is a valid concern, as failure to accurately model the decision process of firms regarding 
how they choose their contracting partners may result in an omitted variables problem, which 
would bias the estimated coefficients in equation 1 even when controlling for household 
selection into contract farming using the WTP method presented above. For example, firms 
could discriminate between potential growers by choosing to contract only with individuals who 
have a level of technical ability higher than a specific threshold. In that case, if technical ability 
is unobserved by the econometrician and correlated with the covariates on the right-hand side of 
equation 1, the estimated coefficients in equation 1 are biased. Consequently, it may not be 
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sufficient to control for selection into contract farming, as discrimination between potential 
growers may also lead to biased estimates of the ATE of contract farming on welfare. 
 
In practice, however, it is unlikely that firms choose their growers on the basis of 
unobservables such as technical ability, entrepreneurial ability, or risk aversion. Even in cases 
where firms exploit decentralized local knowledge by asking growers with whom they have 
contracted in the past to recommend new growers, firms discriminate on the basis of observables. 
Given the richness of the data used in this paper, the econometrician has access to more 
information on observables than the firm does. The inclusion of household characteristics on the 
right-hand side of equation 1 that are more informative than what processing firms have access 
to should thus control for the way firms discriminate between potential growers. 
 
3.3. Robustness Checks Using a Nonparametric Lower Bound WTP Estimate  
In order to check the robustness of the empirical results, equation 1 is also estimated using a 
nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimate for each respondent. When someone answers “Yes” 
to the contingent valuation question, the only thing the econometrician knows with certainty is 
that they would be willing to pay at least  to participate in contract farming. Alternatively, 
when someone answers “No” to the contingent valuation question, they would be willing to pay 
any value in the  interval to participate in contract farming.  
 
The nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimate thus proceeds as follows. Every respondent 
who answers “Yes” to the contingent valuation question is assigned the randomly-generated 
value of  drawn for him as his WTP. Alternatively, every respondent who answer “No” to the 
contingent valuation question is assigned a value of zero as his WTP. Compared to the 
parametric method described above, which assumes that WTP is distributed normally, this 
nonparametric method only assumes that (i) WTP is nonnegative; and that (ii) respondents are 
individually rational, i.e., that they would accept a contract which would increase their annual 
income by 10 percent but which would require no initial investment.  
 
Although the latter assumption is the cornerstone of economics and of social sciences, some 
may balk at imposing the requirement that WTP be nonnegative. After all, there are significant 
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nonmonetary costs to participating in contract farming, which means that WTP could be negative 
for some respondents. Indeed, section 4 shows that some respondents do have negative WTP 
when computing WTP using the parametric method discussed above.  
 
It is not clear, however, whether imposing nonnegative WTP is a better or worse assumption 
than imposing that WTP be normally distributed. More importantly, given that WTP is ancillary 
in this paper – the interest lies is in estimating the ATE of contract farming on a number of 
welfare outcomes rather than getting an unbiased estimate of the WTP of respondents to 
participate in contract farming – what matters in this context is the variation in WTP, which is 
used here to identify the impact of participation in contract farming. Recall that WTP is a 
measure of marginal utility, and that a utility function only represents individual preferences up 
to an affine transformation. Because several utility functions can represent the same preferences, 
what matters for utility functions is their ordinality, not their cardinality. Likewise, the 
assumption that the nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimate be nonnegative affects the 
cardinality of WTP, but what matters in this context is ordinality. 
 
4. Estimation Results and Discussion 
This section first looks at whether contract farming increases welfare nonparametrically by 
comparing, for the households that participate in contract farming and the households that do not 
participate in contract farming, (i) kernel density estimates for the welfare measures selected for 
analysis that are measured continuously; and (ii) the unconditional means of all the welfare 
measures selected for analysis. Because the nonparametric evidence fails to control for 
confounding factors and is only suggestive, the parametric evidence, which presents estimation 
results for the treatment regressions discussed in section 3, follows the nonparametric evidence 
and constitutes the bulk of this section. 
 
4.1. Nonparametric Evidence 
Before proceeding with the estimation sequence outlined in section 3, it is helpful to take a first 
pass at determining whether contract farming has a positive impact on the welfare of the 
households involved by looking at the problem nonparametrically, i.e., by comparing kernel 
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density estimates for a subset of welfare measures as well as the unconditional means of all 
welfare measures by participation regime. 
 
Figures 2 to 6 plot kernel density estimates by participation regime (nonparticipants, i.e., 
households who do not participate in contract farming, and participants, i.e. households who 
participate in contract farming) for the five continuous indicators of welfare retained for analysis, 
i.e., household income, household income per capita, household income per adult equivalent, 
household income net of revenues from contract farming, and duration of the hungry season. 
Figures 2 to 4 suggest that total household income is higher for participants along all three 
measures considered here, but that there are no spillovers from participation in contract farming 
to other income categories, as suggested by figure 5. That is the income, income per capita, and 
income per adult equivalent of households who participate in contract farming is seemingly 
higher than the income, income per capita, and income per adult equivalent of households who 
do not participate in contract farming, but income net of contract farming revenue does not seem 
to vary between participation regimes. Figure 6 suggests that households who participate in 
contract farming experience a shorter hungry season than households who do not participate in 
contract farming. Lastly, figures 2 to 4 further suggest that the income of the households who 
participate in contract farming may be slightly less volatile than the income of households who 
do not participate. 
 
Similarly, table 3 presents mean comparisons by participation regime for the variables 
retained for analysis as well as the result of a t-test of difference in means for each variable. 
These tests suggest that participants and nonparticipants in contract farming differ along almost 
all indicators, and that they are indistinguishable only along their dependency ratios, whether 
respondents are migrants, as well as along the education and agricultural experience of the 
respondents.  
 
More importantly, these tests suggest that the households who participate in contract farming 
report a significantly higher income, income per capita, income per adult equivalent, and income 
net of contract farming revenue; that they experience a shorter hungry season; that they are more 
likely to have obtained a bank or MFI loan over the past 12 months; and that they are wealthier 
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in that they own more in working capital, assets, and landholdings than the households who do 
not participate in contract farming. Thus, table 3 suggests that the households who participate in 
contract farming are better off along all welfare indicators, but that it is the financially better off 
households who may be electing to participate in contract farming. 
 
4.2. Parametric Evidence 
While the foregoing is helpful if one is interested in determining whether participation in 
contract farming is correlated with differences in various welfare indicators (e.g., income; 
income volatility; duration of hungry season; access to formal credit), it says nothing about 
causality. To properly answer the question of whether participation in contract farming 
systematically increases the welfare of the households involved, one must use the statistical 
apparatus presented in section 3. 
 
This section first presents estimation results for the dichotomous choice contingent valuation 
exercise (i.e., equation 4) in table 4. It then presents in tables 5 to 10 estimation results for 
treatment regressions of the various welfare indicators retained for analysis, split between the 
participation (equation 3) and welfare (equation 1) equations. Tables 5 to 10 also present naive 
versions of the welfare equation (equation 1), i.e., versions of the welfare equation in which 
participation is not instrumented. 
 
Although the estimation results presented in tables 5 to 11 allow determining whether 
participation in contract farming has direct impacts on welfare, they do not allow determining 
whether the institution has indirect expected utility impacts on welfare by reducing income 
volatility. For each income measure, table 11 thus presents the results of heteroskedasticity tests 
aimed at determining whether income volatility is equal between the households that participate 
in contract farming and those that do not or whether there are systematic differences in income 
volatility between the two groups. Lastly, table 12 synthesizes the empirical results by presenting 
the estimated ATEs, both for the parametric WTP as well as for the nonparametric WTP.11
 
 
                                                 
11 In the interest of brevity, complete estimation results for the treatment regressions using nonparametric WTP as an 
instrument are not discussed, but they can be found in appendix tables A2 to A6. 
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Table 4 presents estimation results for the dichotomous choice contingent valuation 
experiment, both excluding income as a covariate in column 1 and including it in column 2 (the 
latter being done to study the duration of the hungry season and the likelihood a household 
receives a formal loan, both of which depend on income). Recall that respondents were asked 
whether they would be willing to enter a contract farming arrangement that would increase their 
annual income by 10 percent with certainty but which would require a substantial random initial 
investment. As one would expect, this random initial investment has a significant negative 
impact on the likelihood that the respondent will accept the contract. Moreover, the quantity and 
the quality of labor within the household (i.e., the size of the household and the proportion of 
dependents within the household) also affect the respondent’s answer at the margin: the more 
labor within the household, the more the respondent is likely to be willing to enter contract 
farming, and the lower the quality of the labor available within the household, the less the 
respondent is likely to be willing to enter contract farming.  
 
Older respondents are less likely to be willing to enter contract farming, but the number of 
days on which agricultural work is forbidden for the respondent actually has a positive impact on 
a respondent’s willingness to enter contract farming. This latter finding is interesting in that it 
suggests that respondents perceive agricultural work done under contract as falling outside of the 
purview of taboos and that, as a consequence, one can do contract work on days that are 
otherwise taboos for agricultural work. Lastly, that the results in the second column of table 4 
vary only infinitesimally when including income as a covariate in equation 4. Indeed, the 
estimated coefficient for the dummy capturing whether the respondent is a migrant is decreased 
by 0.001 when including income; all other point estimates and all significance levels remain the 
same. This provides empirical support for the hypothesis that respondents with different income 
levels do not evaluate different contracts when answering the contingent valuation question, i.e., 
that there is no reverse causality between income and the estimated ATE of contract farming. 
 
An estimate of each respondent’s WTP to participate in contract farming is obtained by using 
the formula in equation 5. Figures 7 and 8 present histograms of estimated WTP both excluding 
and including income as a covariate. Once again, the inclusion of income does not seem to 
impact WTP estimates. The last part of table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the estimated 
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WTP. The average respondent would be willing to make an initial investment of US$76.35 when 
excluding income (also US$76.35 when including income) to enter a contract farming 
arrangement that would increase her annual income by 10 percent, with the associated 99 percent 
confidence interval covering the range [US$71.93, US$80.76] when excluding income 
([US$71.94, US$80.77] when including income). That the WTP estimate varies only 
infinitesimally (the means differ only by thousandths of a US dollar, or tenths of a cent) when 
including income as a covariate in equation 4, which is further empirical support in favor of the 
hypothesis that respondents with different income levels do not evaluate different contracts when 
answering the contingent valuation question, i.e., that there is no reverse causality between 
income and the estimated ATE of contract farming. Unsurprisingly, at US$24.28, the mean of 
the nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimate is significantly lower than the mean of the 
parametric WTP estimate. 
 
Interestingly, a little over 10 percent (n=136) of respondents have a negative WTP to enter 
contract farming, i.e., one would need to subsidize their entry in contract farming. In this context, 
as in Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003), WTP is not constrained to be nonnegative. In the interest of 
knowing whose participation should be subsidized, table A1 presents estimation results for a 
linear probability model (LPM) in which the dependent is equal to one if WTP is negative and 
equal to zero otherwise. The results of this LPM indicate that larger households, who have access 
to more labor, are less likely to have negative WTP, but households with higher dependency 
ratios, whose labor is of lower quality, are more likely to have negative WTP. Likewise, single, 
female, and elderly respondents are more likely to have negative WTP, but respondents who are 
members of a peasant organization and respondents for whom agricultural work is forbidden on a 
greater number of days are less likely to have negative WTP. 
 
In order to test whether respondents suffer from cognitive dissonance, i.e., whether WTP is 
systematically different between the households who participate in contract farming and those 
who do not, estimated WTP was regressed on a constant and on the contract farming dummy. As 
it turns out, the estimated coefficient for the contract farming dummy was not statistically 
different from zero and it had a p-value of 0.78. The last part of table 3 shows the result of t-test 
that mean WTP is equal between groups: in neither case can the null hypothesis be rejected. 
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Figures 9 and 10 further show that mean WTP is the same for the households who participate in 
contract farming and for those who do not. In all three of these tests of cognitive dissonance (i.e., 
the regression of WTP on actual contract farming participation as well as figures 9 and 10), one 
does not need to further condition on observables given that WTP itself is estimated conditional 
on observables. 
 
Armed with the respondents’ estimated WTP to enter contract farming, one can estimate 
treatment regressions for each welfare outcome retained for analysis. Table 5 presents estimation 
results for (i) the treatment regression of household income in columns 1 and 2, in which the 
dummy for whether the household participates in contract farming is instrumented with the 
respondent’s WTP to enter contract farming; and (ii) a naive regression of household income in 
column 3, in which the dummy for whether the household participates in contract farming is not 
instrumented. Tables 6 to 10 essentially follow the same plan, but for the other indicators of 
welfare selected for analysis (i.e., household income per capita; household income per adult 
equivalent; household income net of contract farming revenue; duration of the hungry season 
experienced by the household; and a dummy for whether the household receives a formal loan). 
 
Because the empirical results for household participation in contract farming (i.e., the first 
column of table 5) are qualitatively the same in tables 5 to 10, only the results in table 5 are 
discussed here. For every additional year of age, respondents are 1.4 percent less likely to have 
chosen to participate in contract farming, but for every additional year of agricultural experience, 
they are 1.2 percent more likely to have chosen to participate in contract farming. Participation in 
peasant organizations other than contract farming organizations is also associated with 
participation in contract farming in that a household that is a member of a peasant organization is 
almost 50 percent more likely to participate in contract farming than a household who is not a 
member of such an organization. Moreover, for every additional day on which agricultural work 
is forbidden for the respondent, the respondent is 0.6 percent less likely to participate in contract 
farming. Note that although the number of days on which agricultural work was forbidden had 
the opposite impact on whether the likelihood that the respondent would accept the 
(hypothetical) contract in table 4, the results in tables 4 and 5 are not inconsistent given that the 
former did not control for a respondent’s marginal utility of contract farming, which is an 
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important source of unobserved heterogeneity, while the latter do. Finally, for every additional 
dollar of WTP, the average respondent is 0.4 percent more likely to participate in contract 
farming, an effect that is significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
As regards the impact of participation in contract farming, table 5 shows that the institution 
has a positive impact on total household income, but that there is a considerable difference in 
estimated ATEs between the treatment regression and the naive regression. Indeed, while the 
latter regression indicates that participating in contract farming increases a household’s total 
income by US$42 or 3.6 percent of total income, the former indicates that participating in 
contract farming really increases a household’s total income by US$117, or 12 percent of total 
income. So while one may a priori believe that the naive regression would tend to overestimate 
the ATE of contract farming because it fails to control for the fact that households whose income 
is ex ante higher are more likely to participate in contract farming, it turns out that the selection 
mechanism operates in the opposite way. That is, households whose income is ex ante lower are 
the ones who are more likely to participate in contract farming, which biases the naive ATE 
estimate downwards. 
 
Comparing the results of the treatment regression in the first two columns with the results of 
the naive regression in the third column, table 5 also indicates that failing to take into account the 
nonrandom nature of participation in contract farming would lead to false conclusions, and so to 
mistaken policy recommendations for someone interested in increasing participation in contract 
farming. For example, based on the results in the third column of table 5, one would mistakenly 
conclude that female-headed households have a systematically lower income; that the age of the 
respondent does not matter in determining income, but these findings disappear once one 
controls for selection into contract farming in the first two columns of table 5. Interestingly, the 
naive regression also indicates that members of peasant organizations (other than contract 
farming organizations) have systematically higher incomes, but the results in the first two 
columns of table 5 show instead that members of peasant organizations (i) are more likely to 
participate in contract farming; which (ii) increases their income. 
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Turning to the other income measures retained for analysis, the empirical results show that 
participation in contract farming increases household income per capita by US$29.49 or 16 
percent (table 6) and that it increases household income per adult equivalent by US$40.77 or 
17.5 percent (table 7). Participation in contract farming, however, does not have any spillover 
effects on sources of income other than income from contract farming (table 8).  
 
The results in table 9 show that participation in contract farming causes a 2.2-month decrease 
in the duration of the hungry season experienced by the respondent’s household. Likewise, table 
10 presents results for the likelihood that the household has received a formal (i.e., bank or MFI) 
loan. Both the naive and the treatment regression approaches in this case show that the 
households who participate in contract farming are more likely to receive a formal loan, but the 
naive approach biases the result downward. Indeed, while column 3 suggests that households 
who participates in contract farming are on average 7.2 percent more likely to receive a formal 
loan, the results in column 2 show that they are actually 34 percent more likely to receive a 
formal loan. Once again, although one may expect that the naive regression would overestimate 
the ATE of contract farming because it fails to control for the fact that households who are ex 
ante more likely to receive a formal loan are also more likely to participate in contract farming, it 
turns out that the selection mechanism operates in the opposite way. That is, households who are 
ex ante less likely to receive a formal loan are the ones who are more likely to participate in 
contract farming, which biases the naive ATE estimate downwards. Furthermore, the naive 
approach would also suggest that members of peasant organizations are on average more likely 
to receive formal loans than respondents who are not members of such organizations, but as in 
the case of total household income, this finding disappears once the respondents’ selection into 
contract farming is controlled for in the second column. 
 
As regards the expected-utility impact of contract farming (i.e., the impact of participation in 
contract farming on income volatility), table 11 reports the results of tests of group-wise 
heteroskedasticity for each of the dependent variables in tables 5 to 8. That is, it reports the 
results of tests of the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is the same for households 
who participate into contract farming and for those who do not in the equations presented in 
tables 5 to 8. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (i.e., the hypothesis that the variance of 
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the residual is equal between groups) is rejected for all three measures of total income (i.e., 
household income, household income per capita, household income per adult equivalent), but it 
cannot be rejected for income net of contract farming revenue. Moreover, the rejection lies in a 
direction which shows that participation in contract farming significantly reduces the volatility of 
total household income, income per capita, and income per adult equivalent, and that it does so 
by about 16 percent in every case. Over and above directly increasing the welfare of the 
households who participate in contract farming by increasing their income, income per capita, 
and income per adult equivalent as well as by decreasing the duration of the hungry season they 
experience, contract farming indirectly increases their welfare by reducing the amount of income 
risk they are exposed to. 
 
Lastly, table 12a synthesizes the estimation results by presenting the ATE of contract farming 
for each outcome in tables 5 to 10 estimated in one of two ways: (i) using the parametric WTP 
estimate discussed in section 3.1; and (ii) using the nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimate 
discussed in section 3.4.12
 
 These results show that the estimated ATEs are robust to the 
estimation method used to compute respondent WTP to participate in contract farming. 
Likewise, in order to determine whether the impacts of contract farming are significantly 
different between the regions closer to the capital and more remote regions, table 12b synthesizes 
the estimation results for the ATEs of contract farming on income between the regular regions 
(i.e., regions 3, 4, and 11 in figure 1) and the so-called “high-priority growth areas” (i.e., regions 
1, 5, and 22 in figure 1; see section 2). These results indicate that although the ATEs are 
statistically significantly higher in the regions closer to the capital, they are still economically 
significant and positive in the more remote areas. 
What to make of these results? First off, participation in contract farming has a significant 
direct effect on welfare in that it significantly increases total household income, household 
income per capita, and household income per adult equivalent, and the ATEs for these three 
variables are respectively equal to 12 percent of household income, 16 percent of household 
income per capita, and 18 percent of household income per adult equivalent. 
 
                                                 
12 Complete estimation results for the ATEs estimated using nonparametric WTP can be found in the appendix. 
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Second, participation in contract farming decreases the duration of the hungry season 
experienced by the household by about two months and it increases the likelihood that a 
household will receive a formal (i.e., bank or MFI) loan by over 30 percent, probably because 
participation in contract farming sends a credible signal to banks and MFIs that the household 
has been screened for trustworthiness by the processing firm.  
 
Third, participation in contract farming has a significant indirect welfare effects in that it 
reduces by 16 percent the volatility of total household income, household income per capita, and 
household income per adult equivalent. This is a key finding given that in rural areas of 
developing countries, poverty and risk have been found to entail welfare losses of comparable 
magnitude (Ligon and Schechter, 2003; Dercon, 2005). 
 
Finally, although the data are cross-sectional and therefore do not lend themselves to 
analyzing welfare dynamics in relation to contract farming, one can still say something about the 
impact of the institution on inequality. Looking once again at the results in the first column of 
table 5, it looks as though households whose heads are older and less experienced, households 
with smaller landholdings, and households whose heads are not members of a peasant 
organization and for whom more days cannot be spent working in agriculture are less likely to 
participate in contract farming. Thus, it looks as though contract farming may increase inequality 
because it favors those with larger landholdings – who already have more opportunities for 
diversification – and those for whom agricultural work is forbidden on fewer days, a cultural 
artifact that has been shown by Stifel et al. (2008) to significantly reduce agricultural 
productivity at the margin. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using data collected in six regions of Madagascar in 2008, this paper has studied the welfare 
impacts of participation in contract farming. Because participation in contract farming is not 
random, the results of a dichotomous choice contingent valuation experiment were used to 
estimate the WTP of respondents to participate in contract farming, which was then used to 
predict participation in contract farming. This has allowed identifying the change in welfare due 
to a household’s participation in contract farming. 
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The empirical results show that participation in contract farming directly increases total 
household income by 12 percent; household income per capita by 16 percent; household income 
per adult equivalent by 18 percent; and the likelihood that a household will received a formal 
loan by over 30 percent. Moreover, participation in contract farming decreases both the duration 
of the hungry season experienced by the average household by about two months and the 
volatility of the total income of the average household by 16 percent. The latter result implies 
that participation in contract farming has indirect expected utility impacts on household welfare. 
 
What are the policy implications of these findings? In a context where some within the 
development community perceive participation in contract farming as something close to bonded 
labor (Little and Watts, 1994), these findings indicate that contract farming has overwhelmingly 
positive impacts on the welfare of the households involved. As such, even though the institution 
may increase inequality, fostering industrial development by providing incentives for processing 
firms to delegate their production of agricultural commodities and for households to participate 
in agricultural commodity chains would likely contribute to alleviating poverty in these data. 
Concretely, policy makers could stimulate participation in contract farming by targeting 
households headed by older individuals; individuals who are less experienced and who are not 
members of peasant organizations; individuals for whom agricultural work is forbidden on more 
days than others; and households with smaller landholdings, as many of these characteristics are 
also associated with persistent poverty in Madagascar (Stifel et al., 2010). 
 
Finally, it is important to qualify these empirical findings by offering a few caveats. First, as 
Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) point out, a household’s income is not the best measure of welfare 
given that it does not take into account the various costs borne by the household. Instead, farm 
profits would constitute a much better measure of welfare. Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, contract farming activities in the developing world are usually concentrated in areas 
that are easily accessible. Thus, although the findings in this paper indicate that contract farming 
has positive impacts on the welfare of the households involved, whether these findings would 
hold if processing firms were to expand their activities to other communities is an empirical 
question. 
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Figure 1. Map of Madagascar. Numbers Denote Regions and Colors Denote 
Provinces. (Source: Per Johansson/Wikimedia Commons.) 
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Figure 2. Kernel Density Estimation of Household Income by 
Participation Regime with Epanechnikov Kernel and Bandwidth Set Equal 
to 0.5.  
 
 
Figure 3. Kernel Density Estimation of Household Income Per Capita by 
Participation Regime with Epanechnikov Kernel and Bandwidth Set Equal 
to 0.5. 
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Figure 4. Kernel Density Estimation of Household Income Per Adult 
Equivalent by Participation Regime with Epanechnikov Kernel and 
Bandwidth Set Equal to 0.5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Kernel Density Estimation of Household Income Net of Contract 
Farming Revenue by Participation Regime with Epanechnikov Kernel and 
Bandwidth Set Equal to 0.5. 
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Figure 6. Kernel Density Estimation of Hungry Season Duration by 
Participation Regime with Epanechnikov Kernel and Bandwidth Set Equal 
to 0.5. 
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Figure 7. Histogram of Estimated WTP to Participate in Contract Farming 
(Excluding Income as a Conditioning Variable) Overlaid with Normal 
Distribution. 
 
 
Figure 8. Histogram of Estimated WTP to Participate in Contract Farming 
(Including Income as a Conditioning Variable) Overlaid with Normal 
Distribution. 
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Figure 9. Kernel Density Estimation of Estimated WTP by Participation 
Regime (Excluding Income as a Conditioning Variable) with 
Epanechnikov Kernel and Bandwidth Set Equal to 25. 
 
Figure 10. Kernel Density Estimation of Estimated WTP by Participation 
Regime (Including Income as a Conditioning Variable) with 
Epanechnikov Kernel and Bandwidth Set Equal to 25. 
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Table 1. Regions, Communes, and Crops 
    Main Crops under Contract 
Region Commune Primary Secondary 
Alaotra Mangoro (11) Bejofo Rice - 
 
Feramanga North Rice Tomatoes 
Analamanga (4) Amboasary North Rice - 
 
Mangamila Rice Cassava 
Anosy (22) Ebelo Rice Cassava 
 
Andranobory Maize - 
Diana (1) Ambodibonara Cotton Sugarcane 
 
Anketrakabe Rice - 
Itasy (3) Miarinarivo I Green Beans Leeks 
 
Soavinandriana Green Beans Leeks 
Vakinankaratra (5) Morarano Rice Potatoes 
  Betafo Barley Onions 
Note: Numbers between parentheses in the first column refer to the region numbers on the map in figure 1. 
 
 
 
  
35 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (n=1178) 
Variable Mean (Std. Err.) 
Contract Farming Participant Dummy 0.498 (0.016) 
   Household Demographic Characteristics 
  Household Size (Individuals) 5.571 (0.075) 
Dependency Ratio 0.449 (0.008) 
Household Head Characteristics 
  Female Dummy 0.088 (0.010) 
Single Dummy 0.124 (0.011) 
Migrant Dummy 0.125 (0.011) 
Age (Years) 43.274 (0.431) 
Education (Completed Years) 5.682 (0.106) 
Agricultural Experience (Years) 20.621 (0.433) 
Member of Peasant Organization Dummy 0.222 (0.014) 
Forbidden Agricultural Work Days 22.204 (1.105) 
   Household Welfare and Financial Characteristics 
  Income (100,000 Ariary) 19.531 (1.506) 
Income Per Capita (100,000 Ariary) 3.765 (0.238) 
Income Per Adult Equivalent (100,000 Ariary) 4.665 (0.278) 
Income Net of Contract Farming (100,000 Ariary) 17.359 (1.257) 
Duration of Hungry Season (Months) 3.507 (0.076) 
Obtained Formal Loan Dummy 0.121 (0.010) 
Working Capital (100,000 Ariary) 4.440 (0.522) 
Household Assets (100,000 Ariary) 13.965 (0.876) 
   Household Landholdings     
Total Landholdings (Ares) 145.569 (10.138) 
   Willingness to Pay for Contract Farming in US Dollars 
  Parametric WTP (Excluding Income as a Covariate) 76.35 (2.250) 
Parametric WTP (Including Income as a Covariate) 76.35 (2.250) 
 Note: See section 3 for a discussion of how the WTP measures were estimated.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics by Participation Regime (n=1178) 
 
Does Not Participate in 
Contract Farming 
Participates in 
Contract Farming  
  Variable Mean (Std. Err.) Mean (Std. Err.) Difference 
Household Demographic Characteristics 
Household Size 5.452 (0.108) 5.692 (0.104) ** 
Dependency Ratio 0.452 (0.012) 0.446 (0.010) 
 Female 0.119 (0.016) 0.057 (0.011) *** 
Single 0.158 (0.017) 0.089 (0.014) *** 
Migrant 0.124 (0.015) 0.125 (0.015) 
 Age 44.428 (0.652) 42.110 (0.554) *** 
Education 5.650 (0.154) 5.715 (0.147) 
 Agricultural Experience 21.074 (0.653) 20.165 (0.566) 
 Peasant Organization 0.149 (0.017) 0.296 (0.022) *** 
Forbidden Days 23.968 (1.684) 20.427 (1.424) * 
      Household Welfare and Financial Characteristics 
Total Income 14.843 (1.198) 24.255 (2.762) *** 
Income Per Capita 3.072 (0.239) 4.463 (0.413) *** 
Income Per AE 3.802 (0.294) 5.535 (0.471) *** 
Income Net of CF  14.816 (1.197) 19.922 (2.216) *** 
Duration of Hungry Season 3.696 (0.109) 3.316 (0.105) *** 
Obtained Formal Loan 0.074 (0.011) 0.168 (0.017) *** 
Working Capital 2.872 (0.380) 6.021 (0.973) *** 
Assets 11.672 (1.099) 16.277 (1.359) *** 
      Household Landholdings 
     Total Landholdings 113.438 (8.982) 177.956 (18.146) *** 
      WTP for Contract Farming 
     WTP (Excluding Income) 76.700 (3.447) 75.992 (2.873) 
 WTP (Including Income) 76.696 (3.447) 75.986 (2.872) 
 Note: The acronyms AE and CF are short for “adult equivalent” and “contract farming”, respectively. 
For each row, the last column presents the results of a t-test of the null hypothesis that the means are 
equal in both samples. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote a difference in means that is 
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
37 
 
Table 4. Probit Estimation Results for the Contingent Valuation Question 
 
(1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Exluding Income as Covariate Including Income as Covariate 
Dependent Variable: = 1 if Accepts Contract; = 0 Otherwise. 
Household Size 0.078 *** (0.023) 0.078 *** (0.023) 
Dependency Ratio -0.580 ** (0.232) -0.580 ** (0.232) 
Single -0.030 
 
(0.201) -0.030 
 
(0.201) 
Female -0.143 
 
(0.239) -0.143 
 
(0.239) 
Migrant 0.116 
 
(0.152) 0.115 
 
(0.152) 
Age -0.012 * (0.006) -0.012 * (0.006) 
Education -0.002 
 
(0.016) -0.002 
 
(0.016) 
Experience -0.002 
 
(0.006) -0.002 
 
(0.006) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.067 
 
(0.121) 0.067 
 
(0.121) 
Fady Days 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Income 
   
0.000 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital -0.002 
 
(0.002) -0.002 
 
(0.003) 
Assets -0.002 
 
(0.002) -0.002 
 
(0.002) 
Landholdings 0.000 
 
(0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Random Bid (US Dollars) -0.006 *** (0.002) -0.006 ** (0.002) 
Intercept 1.480 *** (0.299) 1.480 *** (0.299) 
Number of Observations 1178 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance,  All Coefficients) 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-square 0.096 0.096 
Note: Estimation results are probability-weighted. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
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Table 5. Treatment Regression and OLS Estimation Results for Household Income 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression OLS 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Log of Household Log of Household 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Income Income 
Household Size -0.010 
 
(0.031) 0.046 *** (0.016) 0.054 *** (0.015) 
Dependency Ratio 0.142 
 
(0.277) -0.095 
 
(0.162) -0.146 
 
(0.148) 
Single 0.098 
 
(0.208) -0.159 
 
(0.144) -0.150 
 
(0.140) 
Female -0.395 
 
(0.242) -0.229 
 
(0.176) -0.338 ** (0.163) 
Migrant 0.026 
 
(0.135) 0.008 
 
(0.103) 0.026 
 
(0.096) 
Age -0.014 * (0.008) 0.010 ** (0.005) 0.004 
 
(0.004) 
Education -0.004 
 
(0.015) 0.069 *** (0.010) 0.068 *** (0.010) 
Experience 0.012 * (0.007) -0.004 
 
(0.004) -0.001 
 
(0.004) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.494 *** (0.112) 0.034 
 
(0.103) 0.174 ** (0.072) 
Forbidden Agricultural Work Days -0.006 *** (0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.006 
 
(0.005) 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Assets 0.002 
 
(0.003) 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Landholdings 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 0.000 * (0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
1.019 *** (0.343) 0.362 *** (0.061) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.004 ** (0.002) 
      Intercept 0.027 
 
(0.368) 0.283 
 
(0.307) 0.773 *** (0.175) 
Number of Observations 1178 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1100.957 - 
p-value (Joint Significance, All Coefficients) 0.000 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.068 - 
R-square - 0.514 
Note: Estimation results are probability-weighted. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results 
in the first column are marginal effects.  
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Table 6. Treatment Regression and OLS Estimation Results for Household Income Per Capita 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression OLS 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Log of Household Income Log of Household Income 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Per Capita Per Capita 
Household Size -0.009 
 
(0.031) -0.133 *** (0.016) -0.126 *** (0.015) 
Dependency Ratio 0.131 
 
(0.277) -0.306 * (0.163) -0.350 ** (0.151) 
Single 0.089 
 
(0.210) 0.052 
 
(0.150) 0.060 
 
(0.147) 
Female -0.390 
 
(0.244) -0.384 ** (0.181) -0.476 *** (0.167) 
Migrant 0.023 
 
(0.135) 0.017 
 
(0.101) 0.033 
 
(0.095) 
Age -0.014 * (0.008) 0.009 * (0.005) 0.005 
 
(0.004) 
Education -0.004 
 
(0.015) 0.071 *** (0.010) 0.070 *** (0.010) 
Experience 0.013 * (0.007) -0.003 
 
(0.004) -0.001 
 
(0.004) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.496 *** (0.112) 0.054 
 
(0.102) 0.172 ** (0.070) 
Forbidden Agricultural Work Days -0.006 *** (0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.006 
 
(0.004) 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.008 *** (0.002) 
Assets 0.002 
 
(0.003) 0.006 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Landholdings 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 0.000 * (0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
0.907 *** (0.353) 0.349 *** (0.061) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.004 ** (0.002) 
      Intercept 0.041 
 
(0.369) -0.208 
 
(0.313) 0.209 
 
(0.177) 
Number of Observations 1178 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1100.987 - 
p-value (Joint Significance, All Coefficients) 0.000 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.128 - 
R-square - 0.511 
Note: Estimation results are probability-weighted. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results 
in the first column are marginal effects. 
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Table 7. Treatment Regression and OLS Estimation Results for Income Per Adult Equivalent 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression OLS 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Log of Household Income Log of Household Income 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Per Adult Equivalent Per Adult Equivalent 
Household Size -0.009 
 
(0.031) -0.126 *** (0.016) -0.120 *** (0.015) 
Dependency Ratio 0.133 
 
(0.277) 0.232 
 
(0.159) 0.189 
 
(0.148) 
Single 0.090 
 
(0.210) 0.053 
 
(0.149) 0.061 
 
(0.147) 
Female -0.391 
 
(0.244) -0.374 ** (0.180) -0.466 *** (0.167) 
Migrant 0.024 
 
(0.135) 0.023 
 
(0.101) 0.039 
 
(0.095) 
Age -0.014 * (0.008) 0.008 
 
(0.005) 0.003 
 
(0.004) 
Education -0.004 
 
(0.015) 0.071 *** (0.010) 0.070 *** (0.010) 
Experience 0.013 * (0.007) -0.003 
 
(0.004) -0.001 
 
(0.004) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.497 *** (0.112) 0.060 
 
(0.101) 0.177 ** (0.070) 
Forbidden Agricultural Work Days -0.006 *** (0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 0.000 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.006 
 
(0.004) 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.008 *** (0.002) 
Assets 0.002 
 
(0.003) 0.006 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Landholdings 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 0.000 * (0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
0.903 *** (0.350) 0.351 *** (0.061) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.004 ** (0.002) 
   
  
 
  
Intercept 0.041 
 
(0.370) -0.170 
 
(0.310) 0.243 
 
(0.176) 
Number of Observations 1178 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1100.259 - 
p-value (Joint Significance, All Coefficients) 0.000 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.129 - 
R-square - 0.493 
Note: Estimation results are probability-weighted. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results 
in the first column are marginal effects. 
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Table 8. Treatment Regression and OLS Estimation Results for Household Income Net of Contract Farming Revenue 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression OLS 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Log of Income Net of Log of Income Net of 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Contract Farming Revenue Contract Farming Revenue 
Household Size -0.011 
 
(0.031) 0.056 *** (0.018) 0.067 *** (0.016) 
Dependency Ratio 0.146 
 
(0.274) -0.045 
 
(0.186) -0.116 
 
(0.160) 
Single 0.123 
 
(0.229) -0.246 
 
(0.201) -0.234 
 
(0.184) 
Female -0.420 * (0.254) -0.083 
 
(0.235) -0.232 
 
(0.198) 
Migrant 0.030 
 
(0.135) -0.004 
 
(0.120) 0.021 
 
(0.109) 
Age -0.014 * (0.008) 0.013 * (0.007) 0.006 
 
(0.004) 
Education -0.004 
 
(0.015) 0.075 *** (0.011) 0.074 *** (0.010) 
Experience 0.012 * (0.007) -0.005 
 
(0.005) 0.000 
 
(0.004) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.489 *** (0.115) -0.037 
 
(0.142) 0.154 * (0.083) 
Forbidden Agricultural Work Days -0.006 *** (0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.006 
 
(0.004) 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.008 *** (0.002) 
Assets 0.002 
 
(0.003) 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Landholdings 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 0.000 * (0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
0.880 
 
(0.560) -0.016 
 
(0.069) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.004 ** (0.002) 
      Intercept 0.041 
 
(0.357) -0.095 
 
(0.486) 0.576 *** (0.203) 
Number of Observations 1178 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1158.073 - 
p-value (Joint Significance, All Coefficients) 0.000 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.132 - 
R-square - 0.461 
Note: Estimation results are probability-weighted. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results in the 
first column are marginal effects. 
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Table 9. Treatment Regression and OLS Estimation Results for Hungry Season Duration 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression OLS 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Duration of Household Duration of Household 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Hungry Season Hungry Season 
Household Size -0.014 
 
(0.030) 0.074 ** (0.037) 0.050 
 
(0.036) 
Dependency Ratio 0.131 
 
(0.270) 0.424 
 
(0.397) 0.576 
 
(0.365) 
Single 0.088 
 
(0.204) -0.049 
 
(0.368) -0.078 
 
(0.338) 
Female -0.414 * (0.241) 0.399 
 
(0.435) 0.723 * (0.400) 
Migrant -0.011 
 
(0.135) 0.086 
 
(0.252) 0.033 
 
(0.216) 
Age -0.014 * (0.007) 0.008 
 
(0.012) 0.024 ** (0.009) 
Education -0.004 
 
(0.015) -0.071 *** (0.025) -0.069 *** (0.022) 
Experience 0.013 ** (0.006) -0.022 ** (0.011) -0.032 *** (0.010) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.504 *** (0.111) 0.518 * (0.266) 0.104 
 
(0.185) 
Fady Days -0.006 *** (0.002) -0.004 
 
(0.003) -0.003 
 
(0.002) 
Income 0.004 ** (0.002) -0.004 ** (0.002) -0.004 ** (0.002) 
Working Capital 0.003 
 
(0.003) 0.003 
 
(0.003) 0.002 
 
(0.003) 
Assets 0.002 
 
(0.003) -0.012 *** (0.003) -0.013 *** (0.003) 
Landholdings 0.000 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
-2.246 *** (0.734) -0.294 ** (0.142) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.004 ** (0.002) 
      Intercept 0.029 
 
(0.351) 4.992 *** (0.713) 3.533 *** (0.433) 
Number of Observations 1178 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1583.265 - 
p-value (Joint Significance, All Coefficients) 0.000 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.009 - 
R-square - 0.197 
Note: Estimation results are probability-weighted. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
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Table 10. Treatment Regression and OLS Estimation Results for the Likelihood the Household Receives a Formal Loan 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression OLS 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract  = 1 if Household Received  = 1 if Household Received 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise a Formal Loan; = 0 Otherwise a Formal Loan; = 0 Otherwise 
Household Size -0.035 
 
(0.032) 0.000 
 
(0.005) 0.003 
 
(0.004) 
Dependency Ratio 0.343 
 
(0.282) -0.018 
 
(0.047) -0.039 
 
(0.041) 
Single 0.113 
 
(0.193) -0.017 
 
(0.041) -0.013 
 
(0.039) 
Female -0.360 
 
(0.237) 0.033 
 
(0.051) -0.012 
 
(0.045) 
Migrant 0.010 
 
(0.134) 0.003 
 
(0.035) 0.010 
 
(0.032) 
Age -0.008 
 
(0.008) 0.004 ** (0.002) 0.002 
 
(0.002) 
Education -0.008 
 
(0.015) 0.014 *** (0.004) 0.014 *** (0.003) 
Experience 0.011 * (0.006) -0.003 * (0.002) -0.002 
 
(0.002) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.491 *** (0.112) 0.025 
 
(0.029) 0.082 *** (0.028) 
Fady Days -0.009 *** (0.003) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Income 0.006 ** (0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.007 
 
(0.005) -0.002 ** (0.001) -0.002 ** (0.001) 
Assets 0.001 
 
(0.003) -0.001 
 
(0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.001) 
Landholdings 0.000 ** (0.000) 0.000 *** (0.000) 0.000 *** (0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
0.342 *** (0.055) 0.071 *** (0.019) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.006 *** (0.002) 
      Intercept -0.315 
 
(0.394) -0.336 *** (0.077) -0.133 ** (0.058) 
Number of Observations 1178 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -462.244 - 
p-value (Joint Significance of All Coefficients) 0.000 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.000 - 
R-square - 0.24 
Note: Estimation results are probability-weighted. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
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Table 11. Results of Tests of Group-Wise Heteroskedasticity (n=1178) 
Null Hypothesis of Homoskedasticity  Test Change in Volatility 
(Equal Error Variance between Participation Regimes) Result Due to Contract Farming 
Total Income (Table 5) Rejected -0.160*** 
Total Income Per Capita (Table 6) Rejected -0.164*** 
Total Income Per Adult Equivalent (Table 7) Rejected -0.165*** 
Total Income Net of CF Revenue (Table 8) Not Rejected 0.025 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The 
acronym CF denotes contract farming. In each row, the squared residuals from each relevant regression in 
tables 6 and 7 were regressed on a constant and a dummy equal to one if a household participates in contract 
farming and equal to zero otherwise. The second column reports the result of a t-test of the null hypothesis 
of homoskedasticity, i.e., the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the contract farming dummy is equal to 
zero. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the volatility of the dependent variable is different 
between participants and nonparticipants. The third column reports the percentage change in volatility due to 
contract farming as well as whether and at what level this change is significant.  
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Table 12a. Synthesis of Estimated ATEs of Contract Farming on Welfare Outcomes 
for Parametric and Nonparametric WTP Estimates 
  (1) (2) 
 
Parametric WTP Nonparametric WTP 
Variable ATE   (Std. Err.) ATE   (Std. Err.) 
Income (US$) 117.056 *** (1.837) 119.233 *** (1.871) 
Volatility of Income (Percent) -0.159 *** (0.057) -0.159 *** (0.057) 
Income Per Capita (US$) 29.491 *** (1.627) 30.353 *** (1.674) 
Volatility of Income Per Capita (Percent) -0.164 *** (0.059) -0.162 *** (0.058) 
Income Per Adult Equivalent  (US$) 40.773 *** (1.587) 42.415 *** (1.651) 
Volatility of Income Per Adult Equivalent  (Percent) -0.165 *** (0.058) -0.163 *** (0.058) 
Income Net of CF Revenue (US$) 93.961   (1.669) 91.197   (1.620) 
Volatility of Income Net of CF Revenue  (Percent) 0.025 
 
(0.061) 0.053 
 
(0.128) 
Duration of Hungry Season (Months) -2.246 *** (0.734) -1.988 ** (0.787) 
Likelihood of Receiving a Formal Loan  (Percent) 0.342 *** (0.055) 0.311 *** (0.063) 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The acronym 
CF denotes contract farming. The results in column 2 are based off of the nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimate 
developed in section 3.3. 
 
 
Table 12b. Synthesis of Estimated ATEs of Contract Farming on Income between 
Growth Areas and Regular Regions for Parametric and Nonparametric WTP 
Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Regular Regions Growth Areas Significance of  
Variable ATE   
(Std. 
Err.) ATE   
(Std. 
Err.) (1) - (2) 
 
Parametric WTP 
Income (US$) 124.263 *** (2.612) 109.107 *** (2.533) *** 
Income Per Capita (US$) 35.489 *** (2.306) 22.874 *** (2.258) *** 
Income Per Adult Equivalent  (US$) 46.696 *** (2.244) 34.238 *** (2.209) *** 
 
Nonparametric WTP 
Income (US$) 126.574 *** (2.660) 111.136 *** (2.581) *** 
Income Per Capita (US$) 36.526 *** (2.373) 23.543 *** (2.324) *** 
Income Per Adult Equivalent  (US$) 48.578 *** (2.334) 35.617 *** (2.298) *** 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The results in 
column 1 are for regions 3, 4, and 11 in figure 1. The results in column 2 are for regions 1, 5, and 22 in figure 1. The 
upper half of the table is based off of the parametric WTP estimate, and the lower half of the table is based off of the 
nonparametric lower bound WTP estimate developed in section 3.3. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Linear Probability Model Estimation Results of the Determinants of Negative WTP 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Exluding Income Including Income 
 
Dependent Variable: = 1 if WTP is Negative; = 0 Otherwise. 
Household Size -0.049 *** (0.004) -0.049 *** (0.004) 
Dependency Ratio 0.422 *** (0.039) 0.422 *** (0.039) 
Single 0.072 * (0.042) 0.072 * (0.042) 
Female 0.098 * (0.053) 0.098 * (0.053) 
Migrant -0.042 
 
(0.029) -0.042 
 
(0.029) 
Age 0.012 *** (0.001) 0.012 * (0.001) 
Education -0.002 
 
(0.003) -0.002 
 
(0.003) 
Experience 0.000 
 
(0.001) 0.000 
 
(0.001) 
Member of Peasant Organization -0.074 *** (0.018) -0.074 *** (0.018) 
Fady Days -0.003 *** (0.000) -0.003 *** (0.000) 
Income 
   
0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Working Capital 0.001 
 
(0.001) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Assets 0.000 
 
(0.001) 0.000 
 
(0.001) 
Landholdings 0.000 
 
(0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Intercept -0.393 *** (0.043) -0.393 *** (0.043) 
Number of Observations 1178 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
p-value (Joint Significance,  All Coefficients) 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R-square 0.465 0.465 
Note: Estimation results are probability-weighted. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent levels.  
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Table A2. Treatment Regression Estimation Results for Household Income Using Nonparametric WTP 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Log of 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Income 
Household Size 0.033 
 
(0.021) 0.046 *** (0.016) 
Dependency Ratio -0.156 
 
(0.212) -0.093 
 
(0.161) 
Single 0.132 
 
(0.205) -0.159 
 
(0.144) 
Female -0.491 ** (0.238) -0.226 
 
(0.174) 
Migrant 0.087 
 
(0.140) 0.008 
 
(0.103) 
Age -0.020 *** (0.007) 0.010 ** (0.005) 
Education -0.007 
 
(0.015) 0.069 *** (0.010) 
Experience 0.011 * (0.007) -0.004 
 
(0.004) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.518 *** (0.108) 0.030 
 
(0.094) 
Fady Days -0.002 
 
(0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.006 
 
(0.005) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Assets 0.001 
 
(0.003) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Landholdings 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
1.038 *** (0.305) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.008 *** (0.002) 
   Intercept 0.370 
 
(0.267) 0.268 
 
(0.281) 
Number of Observations 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1096.159 
p-value (Joint Significance of All Coefficients) 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.033 
R-square - 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results in the first column are marginal effects. 
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Table A3. Treatment Regression Estimation Results for Household Income Per Capita Using Nonparametric WTP 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Log of Income 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Per Capita 
Household Size 0.033 
 
(0.021) -0.133 *** (0.016) 
Dependency Ratio -0.161 
 
(0.214) -0.304 * (0.162) 
Single 0.122 
 
(0.207) 0.052 
 
(0.151) 
Female -0.485 ** (0.240) -0.379 ** (0.180) 
Migrant 0.083 
 
(0.140) 0.016 
 
(0.101) 
Age -0.020 *** (0.007) 0.009 ** (0.005) 
Education -0.006 
 
(0.015) 0.071 *** (0.010) 
Experience 0.011 * (0.007) -0.003 
 
(0.004) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.518 *** (0.109) 0.048 
 
(0.094) 
Fady Days -0.002 
 
(0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.006 
 
(0.005) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Assets 0.001 
 
(0.003) 0.006 *** (0.002) 
Landholdings 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
0.933 *** (0.331) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.008 *** (0.002) 
   Intercept 0.373 
 
(0.268) -0.228 
 
(0.297) 
Number of Observations 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1095.322 
p-value (Joint Significance of All Coefficients) 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.086 
R-square - 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results in the first column are marginal effects. 
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Table A4. Treatment Regression Estimation Results for Household Income Per Adult Equivalent Using Nonparametric 
WTP 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Log of Income Per 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Adult Equivalent 
Household Size 0.033 
 
(0.021) -0.127 *** (0.016) 
Dependency Ratio -0.158 
 
(0.213) 0.235 
 
(0.159) 
Single 0.122 
 
(0.207) 0.053 
 
(0.150) 
Female -0.485 ** (0.240) -0.368 ** (0.179) 
Migrant 0.083 
 
(0.140) 0.022 
 
(0.101) 
Age -0.020 *** (0.007) 0.008 * (0.005) 
Education -0.006 
 
(0.015) 0.071 *** (0.010) 
Experience 0.011 * (0.007) -0.004 
 
(0.004) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.519 *** (0.109) 0.052 
 
(0.093) 
Fady Days -0.002 
 
(0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.006 
 
(0.005) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Assets 0.001 
 
(0.003) 0.006 *** (0.002) 
Landholdings 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
0.940 *** (0.323) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.008 *** (0.002) 
   Intercept 0.370 
 
(0.268) -0.197 
 
(0.291) 
Number of Observations 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1094.555 
p-value (Joint Significance of All Coefficients) 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.077 
R-square - 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results in the first column are marginal effects. 
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Table A4. Treatment Regression Estimation Results for Household Income Net of CF Revenue Using Nonparametric 
WTP 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Log of Income Net of 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Contract Farming Revenue 
Household Size 0.031 
 
(0.021) 0.057 *** (0.018) 
Dependency Ratio -0.152 
 
(0.211) -0.047 
 
(0.183) 
Single 0.153 
 
(0.224) -0.246 
 
(0.200) 
Female -0.512 ** (0.251) -0.088 
 
(0.231) 
Migrant 0.087 
 
(0.141) -0.003 
 
(0.120) 
Age -0.020 *** (0.007) 0.013 
 
(0.006) 
Education -0.007 
 
(0.015) 0.075 *** (0.011) 
Experience 0.011 * (0.007) -0.005 
 
(0.005) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.512 *** (0.111) -0.031 
 
(0.133) 
Fady Days -0.002 
 
(0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.006 
 
(0.005) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Assets 0.001 
 
(0.003) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
Landholdings 0.001 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
0.854 
 
(0.521) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.007 *** (0.002)   
 
  
Intercept 0.391 
 
(0.271) -0.075 
 
(0.454) 
Number of Observations 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1152.29 
p-value (Joint Significance of All Coefficients) 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.113 
R-square - 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results in the first column are marginal effects. 
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Table A5. Treatment Regression Estimation Results for Hungry Season Duration Using Nonparametric WTP 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract Duration of Household 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise Hungry Season 
Household Size 0.029 
 
(0.021) 0.071 ** (0.036) 
Dependency Ratio -0.158 
 
(0.211) 0.444 
 
(0.388) 
Single 0.110 
 
(0.203) -0.053 
 
(0.361) 
Female -0.500 ** (0.234) 0.442 
 
(0.430) 
Migrant 0.055 
 
(0.140) 0.079 
 
(0.246) 
Age -0.020 *** (0.006) 0.010 
 
(0.011) 
Education -0.006 
 
(0.015) -0.071 *** (0.024) 
Experience 0.012 * (0.006) -0.023 ** (0.010) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.531 *** (0.110) 0.463 * (0.257) 
Fady Days -0.002 
 
(0.002) -0.004 
 
(0.002) 
Income 0.004 ** (0.002) -0.004 ** (0.002) 
Working Capital 0.003 
 
(0.003) 0.003 
 
(0.003) 
Assets 0.001 
 
(0.003) -0.012 *** (0.003) 
Landholdings 0.000 ** (0.000) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
-1.988 ** (0.787) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.007 *** (0.002)       
Intercept 0.372 
 
(0.268) 4.799 *** (0.749) 
Number of Observations 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -1577.522 
p-value (Joint Significance of All Coefficients) 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.037 
R-square - 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results in the first column are marginal effects. 
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Table A6. Treatment Regression Estimation Results for the Likelihood of Receiving a Formal Loan  
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
 
Treatment Regression 
  Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable: 
 
= 1 if Participates in Contract  = 1 if Household Received 
 
Farming; = 0 Otherwise a Formal Loan; = 0 Otherwise 
Household Size 0.031 
 
(0.021) 0.000   (0.005) 
Dependency Ratio -0.128 
 
(0.209) -0.020 
 
(0.046) 
Single 0.121 
 
(0.191) -0.017 
 
(0.041) 
Female -0.488 ** (0.228) 0.028 
 
(0.050) 
Migrant 0.098 
 
(0.138) 0.003   (0.035) 
Age -0.018 *** (0.007) 0.004 ** (0.002) 
Education -0.010 
 
(0.015) 0.014 *** (0.004) 
Experience 0.010 
 
(0.007) -0.003 * (0.002) 
Member of Peasant Organization 0.536 *** (0.110) 0.032 
 
(0.029) 
Fady Days -0.003 * (0.002) 0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Income 0.005 ** (0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
Working Capital 0.005 
 
(0.005) -0.002 ** (0.001) 
Assets 0.000 
 
(0.002) -0.001 
 
(0.000) 
Landholdings 0.000 * (0.000) 0.000 *** (0.000) 
Contract Farming 
   
0.311 *** (0.063) 
WTP for Contract Farming 0.007 *** (0.002) 
   Intercept 0.339 
 
(0.267) -0.312 *** (0.079) 
Number of Observations 1178 
Region Fixed Effects Yes 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -456.922 
p-value (Joint Significance of All Coefficients) 0.000 
p-value (Test of Independent Equations) 0.000 
R-square - 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Results in the first column are marginal effects. 
